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Abstract 
In three experiments, we propose and find that individuals cheat more when others can benefit 
from their cheating and when the number of beneficiaries of wrongdoing increases. Our results 
indicate that people use moral flexibility to justify their self-interested actions when such actions 
benefit others in addition to the self. Namely, our findings suggest that when people’s dishonesty 
would benefit others, they are more likely to view dishonesty as morally acceptable and thus feel 
less guilty about benefiting from cheating. We discuss the implications of these results for 
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1.  Introduction 
It seems a day doesn’t go by without a revelation of unethical behavior by a politician, a 
movie star, a professional athlete, or a high-ranking executive. To take one example, in 2007, 
Major League Baseball pitcher Andy Pettitte was accused of using human growth hormones, a 
substance banned by the league. Pettitte publicly confessed that he did not take the drugs ―to try 
to get an edge,‖ but rather to try to get off the disabled list so that he ―would not let his team 
down.‖ According to Pettitte, his unethical actions were motivated by the benefits that would 
accrue to others rather than by potential direct benefits to himself.  
How does the presence of others who may benefit from our dishonesty influence our 
willingness to cross ethical boundaries? This paper suggests that the potential benefits dishonesty 
may create for others not only help people justify their bad behavior but also act as a (self-
serving) motivator for it. We propose and find that by focusing on the social utility of others, 
people can more freely categorize their own actions in positive terms and avoid negative 
updating of their moral self-image (Baumeister 1998; Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008; Schweitzer 
& Hsee, 2002). As a result, people feel less guilty about their dishonest behavior when others (in 
addition to themselves) can benefit from it.  
1.1 Cheating Motivated by Potential Benefits to Others 
Ethical dilemmas often involve an apparent conflict: by behaving ethically, people can 
maintain their positive self-image; by behaving unethically, they can advance their self-interest 
(Gino et al., 2011; Mead et al., 2009). People often resolve this conflict through creative 
reassessments and self-serving rationalizations (Gino & Ariely, 2012; Shalvi, Dana,  Handgraaf, 
& De Dreu,  2011), such that they can act dishonestly enough to profit from their unethicality but 
honestly enough to maintain a positive self-concept (e.g., Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2009; Mazar et Self-serving Altruism  4 
al., 2008). Recent research has found that when individuals have the opportunity to cheat when 
the probability of being caught and reputational costs are minimized, most people do cheat, but 
not as much as they could (e.g., Ayal & Gino, 2011; Gino et al., 2009). They cheat enough to 
benefit financially, but not to the extent that they feel obligated to negatively revise their self-
image (Mazar & Ariely, 2006).  
Using their creativity, people can recruit a variety of reasons to justify ―minor‖ cheating 
(Gino & Ariely, 2012). For instance, they might decide that others would surely cheat under the 
same circumstances or that a little cheating won’t hurt anyone. People may make these (self-
serving) justifications to convince themselves and others that their behavior is in fact ethical 
(Diekmann, 1997; Gino & Ariely, 2012; Lewis et al., 2012). Wiltermuth (2011) found that 
people are more likely to behave unethically if they split the spoils of such behavior with another 
person than when they are the sole beneficiaries. They find it easier to discount the moral 
concerns associated with unethical behavior that benefits another person than to discount 
behavior that only benefits themselves (Wiltermuth, 2011; see also Erat & Gneezy, 2012, Gino 
& Pierce, 2010 and Shalvi, & Leiser, 2013). Overall, this research suggests that people use the 
potential benefits for others to justify their self-serving, often unethical actions. When dishonest 
actions only benefit the self, there can be little doubt that they were self-serving. But ambiguity 
clouds this clear motivation when others benefit from one’s cheating.  
In addition to using others to justify selfish behavior, research shows that people truly 
care about improving the outcomes of their peers (Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989). 
According to this research, the utility function that individuals gather from monetary outcomes is 
a composite of nonsocial utility (one’s own payment) and social utility (another’s payment) 
(Loewenstein et al., 1989; Messick & Sentis, 1985). Consistent with this explanation, research Self-serving Altruism  5 
has found that concern for the outcomes and well-being of others can lead people to behave 
unethically when they feel empathy toward the beneficiaries of their dishonesty (Gino & Pierce, 
2009) or feel similar to them (Gino et al., 2009).  
Taken together, these findings suggest two different mechanisms through which the 
presence of other beneficiaries of one’s own dishonesty may lead to increased cheating. First, the 
presence of other beneficiaries may help people easily justify their dishonesty. Second, people 
may genuinely care about the potential benefits of their actions for others. We conducted three 
experiments to investigate how these two mechanisms interact to affect dishonesty.  
1.2.  Predictions 
Our research contributes to prior work demonstrating that the presence of beneficiaries 
influences one’s own likelihood to behave dishonestly (e.g., Gino & Pierce, 2009; Wiltermuth, 
2011) by distinguishing among different mechanisms that may explain greater cheating when 
benefits are split with others. In addition, our research considers cases in which more than one 
other person can benefit from one’s cheating. Finally, unlike prior investigations, this paper 
directly examines the consequences of cheating that only benefits oneself versus cheating that 
benefits oneself and others on both one’s levels of guilt and moral self-image. We predicted that 
although participants would be more likely to behave unethically when others in addition to 
themselves could benefit from their dishonesty, they would also experience less guilt after their 
cheating and thus be better able to preserve their moral self-image. We tested these hypotheses in 
three experiments in which participants had the opportunity to cheat.  
2.  Experiment 1  
2.1. Method Self-serving Altruism  6 
2.1.1. Participants and design. Participants were 193 college and graduate students (105 
male; Mage=21, SD=1.75) from local universities in a Midwestern U.S. city. The study employed 
two between-subjects manipulations: the possibility of cheating (control vs. shredder) and the 
party who stands to gain from the act of cheating (individual vs. dyad vs. group).  
2.1.2. Procedure. Participants received the entire set of instructions for the experiment, 
such that they knew exactly what it would involve. Each participant received a test sheet with 20 
matrices and a separate collection slip on which to later write down how many of the matrices 
they solved correctly. Each matrix included a different set of 12 three-digit numbers (e.g., 6.18, 
see Mazar et al., 2008), and participants had five minutes to find two numbers per matrix that 
added up to 10. In all conditions, participants received $0.50 for each matrix solved correctly. 
In the individual-control condition, once the five minutes had passed, participants 
counted the number of matrices they had solved correctly and then wrote down that number on 
their collection slips. The experimenter verified the number once participants handed in their test 
sheet and paid them based on their performance. 
In the individual-shredder condition, once the five minutes had passed, participants were 
asked to count the number of matrices they had correctly solved, place the test sheet into a 
shredder, and only then write down the number of correctly solved matrices on their collection 
slip. They then handed their collection slip to the experimenter and were paid based on their 
reported performance without any verification process. The difference in performance between 
the control and shredder conditions measures participants’ degree of dishonesty. 
In the dyad-control condition, once the five minutes had passed, participants counted the 
number of matrices they had solved correctly and then wrote that number on their collection 
slips. Participants were next asked to find their ―partner‖—a fellow participant with the same ID Self-serving Altruism  7 
number at the top of his or her collection slip, but on a different color paper. Once a dyad was 
united, the two dyad members were asked to show each other their collection slips. Next, they 
each summed up their dyad’s total performance and wrote this figure down on their own 
collection slips. Finally, each dyad approached the experimenter together and submitted their 
collection slips and worksheets, and then each dyad member was paid according to half of their 
joint performance, which was verified by the experimenter. 
In the dyad-shredder condition, once the five minutes had passed, participants 
individually counted the number of matrices they had solved correctly, placed the test sheet into 
a shredder, and only then wrote down the number of correctly solved matrices on their collection 
slips. Participants were next asked to find their partner. The rest of the procedure was the same 
as that used in the dyad-control condition, but without any verification process.   
Finally, the procedure in the three-person group conditions was the same as in the dyad 
conditions but with three people, each of whom received one third of the total group payment. 
2.2 Results  
We computed the average reported performance for each of the conditions (individual, 
dyad, and group), and used it as the dependent variable in a 2 (possibility of cheating) X 3 (group 
type) between-subjects ANOVA. This analysis revealed a significant main effect for both the 
possibility of cheating (F]1,78] =169, p<.001, η
2=.69) and group size (F[2,78]=8.06, p=.001, 
η
2=.17), as well as a significant interaction (F[2,78]=7.52, p=.001, η
2=.16). 
Performance was similar across the three control conditions (F<1), suggesting that group 
size did not increase motivation or ability to perform on the problem-solving task (see Figure 1). 
In contrast, when cheating was possible, ―performance‖ was higher and varied depending on the 
number of beneficiaries (F[2,39]=10.93, p<.001, η
2=.36). Participants in the dyad-shredder Self-serving Altruism  8 
condition reported a higher performance (M=13.83, SD=2.65) than did those in the individual-
shredder condition (M=11.07, SD=3.24; p<.01). In addition, participants in the group-shredder 
condition reported a higher performance (M=15.92, SD=2.07) than did those in either the dyad-
shredder condition (p<.05) or the individual-shredder condition (p<.001).  
 
Figure 1. Reported and actual number of correctly identified pairs by experimental condition 
(Experiment 1). Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
2.3 Discussion 
The results of our first experiment show that whenever cheating benefits other people (as 
in the dyad-shredder or in the group-shredder conditions), dishonesty increases, and that this 
increase is influenced by the number of people who stand to benefit from one’s own unethical 
actions. The more people can benefit from an individual’s unethical actions, the greater the 
cheating. This result is consistent with our predictions and suggests that the presence of other 
beneficiaries facilitates dishonest behavior.  
3.  Experiment 2 Self-serving Altruism  9 
Our second experiment examines whether focusing on the benefits of one’s cheating for 
others can help people maintain a positive moral self-image. In addition, this second study allows 
us to test the plausibility of an alternative explanation for the results of Experiment 1. Notably, 
increased group size meant a lower financial benefit from cheating (Individual: the full benefit of 
cheating; Dyad: half the benefit; Group: a third of it). Thus, the increase in cheating observed in 
Experiment 1 might be a result of the change in financial incentives across conditions. Finally, to 
eliminate any expectation of reciprocity participants may have had in Experiment 1, we also 
modified the study procedure so that the potential beneficiaries of one’s own cheating were 
randomly selected participants from another experiment instead of group members participating 
in the same study. 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1. Participants and design. One hundred and seven college students at a university 
in the Southeastern United States (58 male; Mage=20.64, SD=1.56) participated in the study for 
pay ($3 show-up fee plus the money they could earn throughout the study). Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions: self-only high-payoff condition, self-only low-
payoff condition, and self-and-other payoff condition.  
3.1.2. Procedure. We used the same problem-solving task as in Experiment 1, but we 
modified the procedure so that we could directly track who cheated by over-reporting 
performance on the task. In this study, participants did not shred their test sheets but instead put 
their test sheets, which were seemingly anonymous, into a recycle box. All participants received 
the same matrices to solve in the five-minute time period, except for a single number that was 
unique for each participant. One of the three-digit numbers in the matrix used as an example on 
the back of each collection slip matched the unique number on the corresponding test sheet. This Self-serving Altruism  10 
allowed us to match the worksheet with the collection slip of each participant at the end of the 
study (without learning the identity of the participant) and compute the difference between self-
reported and actual performance. This difference score was our main dependent variable.  
3.1.3. Payoff manipulation. Across conditions, we manipulated the payoff structure. In 
the self-only high (low) payoff condition, participants were told they would receive $2 ($1) for 
each correctly solved problem. In the self-and-other payoff condition, participants were told they 
would receive $1 for each correctly solved problem and that another participant randomly 
selected from a group of participants from another experiment would also receive $1 for each 
correctly solved problem. We included two self-only-payoff conditions (high and low) to ensure 
that the differences observed in our first experiment were not driven by the perception that 
cheating for a larger payoff ($2 to the self instead of just $1) is more unethical. 
3.1.4. Guilt and moral self-image. After filling out their collection slips, participants 
answered a short questionnaire. In addition to answering some bogus questions, participants 
indicated the extent to which they felt remorse, guilt, and regret (α=.90) on a 7-point scale (1=not 
at all, 7=to a great extent). These emotions capture state guilt (Marschall et al., 1994). 
Participants also indicated ―how good of a person‖ they felt they were (7-point scale, 1=not at 
all, 7=very much). 
3.2. Results  
3.2.1. Cheating. The percentage of participants who cheated by over-reporting 
performance on the problem-solving task varied by condition, χ
2(2,N=107)=9.70, p<.01 (see 
Table 1). Fifty-six percent (20/36) cheated in the self-and-other payoff condition; 28% (10/36) 
cheated in the self-only-high-payoff condition; and 23% (8/35) cheated in the self-only-low-
payoff condition. Mirroring these results, the average number of matrices by which participants Self-serving Altruism  11 
overstated their performance varied by condition (F[2,125]=6.31, p<.01, η
2=.11). On average, 
participants cheated more in the self-and-other-payoff condition as compared to both the self-
only-high-payoff condition (p<.01) and the self-only-low-payoff condition (p<.01). The 
difference in the level of cheating between these last two conditions was not significant (p=.79). 
Table 1 










3.2.2. Guilt and moral self-image. We then examined the extent to which participants 
felt guilty and perceived themselves as moral after cheating across conditions. For these 
analyses, we only considered people who cheated. Participants reported less guilt in the self-and-
other-payoff condition as compared to both the self-only-high-payoff condition (p<.01) and the 
self-only-low-payoff condition (p<.02), F(2,35)=6.29, p<.01, η
2=.26. The difference in guilt 
between these last two conditions was not significant (p=.72). Similarly, participants rated 
themselves as being better people in the self-and-other payoff condition as compared to both the 




























condition  56%  3.47 (3.42)  3.90 (0.97)  4.10 (1.02) 
Self-only-high-payoff 
condition  28%  1.44 (2.55)  5.03 (0.92)  3.30 (0.95) 
Self-only-low-payoff 
condition  23%  1.26 (2.74)  4.88 (0.82)  3.13 (1.13) Self-serving Altruism  12 




3.2.3. Mediation analysis. Using mediation analysis (Preacher and Hayes, 2004), we 
next tested whether participants who cheated on the problem-solving task in the self-and-other-
payoff condition were better able to maintain a moral self-image because they experienced lower 
levels of guilt compared to those who cheated in the other two conditions. The effect of the self-
and-other-payoff condition on perceived moral self-image was reduced to non-significance (from 
β=.41, p=.011, to β=−0.04, p=.71) when experienced guilt was included in the equation, and guilt 
was a significant predictor of participants’ perceived moral self-image (β=−0.87, p<.001; 95% 
bias-corrected CI=[0.45,1.49]), providing support for mediation (MacKinnon et al., 2007).
2  
3.3. Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 indicate that participants cheated more when others could 
benefit from their dishonesty than when they alone benefited, and experienced less guilt after 
their cheating. As a result, they more easily preserved their moral self-image. In addition, the 
lack of significant difference in the level of cheating (as well as in guilt and perceived moral self-
image) between the self-only-high-payoff condition and the self-only-low-payoff condition 
suggests that the amount of financial incentive was not the main driver of participants’ decisions 
to cheat, nor of their consequent guilt and perceived moral self-image.  
4.  Experiment 3 
So far, we found that when other individuals benefit from one’s dishonesty, cheating 
increases, but one’s moral self-image is not impacted as much as when only the self benefits. 
                                                 
1 We found no significant differences in guilt across conditions for participants who did not cheat on the problem-
solving task, F(2, 66) = 1.04, p = .36, η
2 = .03. Similarly, we found no significant differences in moral self-image 
across conditions, F(2, 66) < 1. 
2 These results also help to rule out the possibility that participants are not automatically bolstering their moral self-
image after cheating by telling themselves that normally they are good, ethical people. Self-serving Altruism  13 
What drives this increased willingness to behave unethically in such situations? One possibility 
is that when others can also benefit from one’s own dishonesty, individuals more easily 
categorize their own unethical actions (cheating) in positive terms (creating financial benefits for 
others) and therefore cheat to a larger degree. Alternatively, it is possible that people truly care 
about such benefits and social utility.  
In Experiment 3, we further varied the payoff structure to test whether the increased 
cheating we observed in Experiments 1 and 2 is more likely attributed to an increased ability to 
justify dishonest behavior or to true concern for potential benefits to others.  
4.1 Method 
4.1.1. Participants and design. One hundred and twenty eight college and graduate 
students from local universities (65 male; Mage=21.35, SD=2.89) in a Southeastern U.S. city 
participated in the study for pay ($3 show-up fee and the opportunity to earn more throughout the 
study). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: self-only payoff, self-
and-other payoff, and other-only payoff.  
4.1.2. Procedure. The study included two tasks: a math task (used to assess cheating) and 
a final questionnaire that included questions regarding the perceived ethicality of acts of 
cheating. 
4.1.3. Cheating task. Participants engaged in a computer-based mental-arithmetic task in 
which they had to calculate the answers to 20 different problems (e.g., 2+5+23-17+13-8+11-
5+9-3 = ?) presented individually (adapted from von Hippel et al., 2005). The experimenter 
informed participants that the computer had a special feature: As they were working on each 
problem, the correct answer would appear on the screen unless they stopped it from being 
displayed by pressing the space bar right after the problem appeared. The experimenter also Self-serving Altruism  14 
informed participants that although she would not monitor whether they pressed the space bar or 
not, they should try to solve the problems on their own. In fact, the program automatically 
recorded participants’ number of space-bar presses. Following prior research (Jordan et al., 2011; 
Shu & Gino, 2012; von Hippel et al., 2005; Vohs & Schooler, 2008), we used the number of 
times participants did not press the space bar, thus allowing the correct answer to appear, as our 
measure of cheating.
3  
4.1.4. Payoff manipulation. Across the three conditions, we implemented different 
allocations of the total payoff. In the self-only-payoff condition, participants were told they 
would receive $2 for each correctly solved problem. In the self-and-other-payoff condition, 
participants were told they would receive $1 for each correctly solved problem. In addition, they 
were told that another participant randomly selected from a group of participants from another 
experiment would also receive $1 for each correctly solved problem. Finally, in the other-only-
payoff condition, participants were told that their performance on the task would not influence 
their payment in the study, but that another participant randomly selected from a group from 
another experiment would receive $2 for each correctly solved problem.
4  
4.1.5. Perceived unethicality. After being paid for the task, participants received a one-
page questionnaire. The instructions informed them that because of the programming feature, 
―some participants may intentionally decide not to press the space bar so that they can see the 
correct answer and successfully solve the problem.‖ Using 7-point scales, participants then 
indicated how unethical, wrong, and morally unacceptable it would be for a participant not to 
                                                 
3 By allowing the answers to appear on the screen, participants disobeyed the experimenter’s rules and walked away 
with greater payment than they would have earned by solving the problems on their own.  
4 In this study, participants in the other-only-payoff condition received $5 in addition to their show-up fee as 
compensation. We conducted another study using the same design and procedure in which participants in the other-
only-payoff condition received either $2 or $8 in addition to their show-up fee as compensation. The nature and 
significance of the results did not change with different levels of fixed pay. Self-serving Altruism  15 
press the space bar in two different instances: 1) when the participant was paid $2 for every 
correctly solved problem (α=.78), and 2) when the participant and another randomly chosen 
participant from another study were both paid $1 for every correctly solved problem (α=.80).    
4.2. Predictions 
The payoff manipulation enables us to juxtapose the effects of the ability to justify 
unethical behavior as appropriate and true concern about others’ benefits. Specifically, while 
both mechanisms predict an increase in cheating in the self-and-other-payoff condition compared 
to the self-only-payoff condition, they make different predictions about the level of cheating in 
the other-only-payoff condition. In fact, as compared to the self-and-other-payoff condition, 
there is no direct self-interest (money or justification) at play in the other-only-payoff condition, 
but only an increased potential benefit to another person from one’s own cheating.  
Thus, if individuals use the potential benefits for others merely to justify their own 
unethical actions, we would expect the level of cheating to be eliminated in the other-only-payoff 
condition, as any cheating in the other-only-payoff condition would not benefit the self and thus 
eliminate the need for self-justification.  
In contrast, if individuals only care about others’ utility, then we would expect the level 
of social utility to be higher in the other-only-payoff condition (when others benefit 100% from 
an individual’s cheating) than in the self-and-other-payoff condition (when others benefit 50%).  
Finally, if these two factors work in concert to promote dishonesty, cheating should be 
highest in the self-and-other-payoff condition and lower but not eliminated in the other two 
conditions.  
4.3. Results  Self-serving Altruism  16 
4.3.1. Cheating. The number of times participants did not press the space bar across 
conditions (our measure of cheating) varied significantly by condition (F[2,125]=4.23, p<.05, 
η
2=.06). Participants cheated more frequently in the self-and-other-payoff condition (M=11.29, 
SD=4.92) as compared to both the self-only-payoff condition (M=8.40, SD=5.83, p<.05) and the 
other-only-payoff condition (M=8.16, SD=5.71, p=.01). The amount of cheating did not 
significantly differ in these last two conditions (p=.85). 
Since cheating occurred by omission rather than commission in this task, and since the 
task included multiple rounds (in each of which participants could cheat), most participants 
cheated in at least a few rounds on this task (as in Shu & Gino, 2012). The percentage of 
participants who cheated varied by condition, χ
2(2,N= 128)=7.07, p<.05. Ninety-eight percent 
(41/42) cheated in the self-and-other-payoff condition; 79% (34/43) cheated in the self-only-
payoff condition; and 88% (38/43) cheated in the other-only-payoff condition. 
4.3.2. Perceived unethicality. Next, we examined the responses to the follow-up 
questions regarding perceived unethicality to test whether participants considered dishonest 
behavior to be less morally problematic when it benefitted other people in addition to the self 
rather than the self alone. A within-subjects analysis revealed that participants rated cheating on 
the task as more unethical when they were told only they themselves would benefit (M=5.17, 
SD=0.74) than when they were told others would also benefit (M=4.51, SD=1.07), 
F(1,127)=38.84, p<.001, η
2=.23.  
We conducted the same within-subjects ANOVA, but this time we included whether or 
not the participant cheated as a control variable. We did so because participants who cheat are 
likely to be motivated to report that cheating is not very morally wrong (Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 
2011). Given that more participants cheated in the self-and-other-payoff condition than in the Self-serving Altruism  17 
other two conditions, this motivation to justify their behavior may have produced the previously 
discussed result that cheating to benefit others is perceived as less unethical. However, this 
analysis also revealed a significant within-subject effect, F(1,126)=9.57, p<.01, η
2=.07) which 
thus excluded this interpretation. Finally, in contrast to the two aforementioned analyses in 
which we considered all participants, we conducted an additional within-subjects analysis by 
focusing only on participants who cheated on the task (i.e., a subsample). We again found a 
significant within-subject effect, F(1,112)=39.26, p<.001, η
2=.26 (Monly_self =5.18, SD=0.74 vs. 
Mother=4.47, SD=1.06). Together, these results suggest that participants who cheated rated their 
behavior as more unethical when they were told only they themselves would benefit rather than 
when they were told others would also benefit.  
4.4. Discussion 
These results show that participants cheated the most when given the opportunity to favor 
another participant in addition to the self, even if this beneficiary was an anonymous stranger. In 
the other-only-payoff condition, where there was no benefit to the self from behaving 
dishonestly, we still observed some cheating, but it was significantly lower than in the self-and-
other-payoff condition and slightly lower than in the self-only-payoff condition.  
This finding suggests that people do care about the benefits of their actions for others. 
However, this caring has a much larger effect on their dishonesty when such actions also accrue 
benefits to the self. The presence of beneficiaries encourages individuals to maximize their social 
utility while allowing them to boost their own utility and more easily justify their unethical 
behavior. Indeed, participants in all three conditions also rated their unethical actions as more 
morally acceptable when others could benefit from them as compared to when they created 
benefits only for the self.  Self-serving Altruism  18 
5.  General Discussion 
  We are all familiar with the excuses that wrongdoers, ranging from Martha Stewart to 
Bernard Madoff, offer for their transgressions. People often stress how their actions benefit 
others, such as clients, shareholders, or their organizations. In this paper, we tested whether such 
claims are only justifications or whether they could also reflect genuine concern for others. The 
results demonstrate that when the outcome of an individual’s dishonesty could benefit another 
person, the level of individual cheating increased. Even when cheating only benefited another 
person and not the self (i.e., the other-only-payoff condition in Experiment 3), some cheating 
was still present. The fact that cheating was not eliminated in this condition seems to indicate 
that people truly care for the social utility of others. However, individuals were more likely to 
behave unethically when dishonesty benefited others in addition to the self (i.e., the self-and-
other-payoff condition). These results suggest that social utility and justification work in concert 
and that these two factors have an additive effect in promoting individuals’ dishonesty. 
This research contributes to the ethical decision making literature by suggesting that 
dishonesty should be studied not only at the individual level but also at the group level, where 
members can influence one another through both their ethical and unethical behavior. As our 
results show, even when each individual works on a different task, the presence of others who 
may benefit from our unethical behavior can sway our moral compass. A more nuanced 
understanding of cheating within group contexts would be a promising path for future research 
that may examine the best ―choice architecture‖ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) and identify 
techniques for gaining the benefits of collaboration without paying the cost of increased 
dishonesty.  
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